NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

MEDIA AFFECT ON THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER:

ARE YOU PREPARED FOR IT?

by

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Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily
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
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15. Abstract: Most over the age of 30 have grown up accepting the premise that wars are waged by generals and later analyzed by historians. As the twentieth century bids us adieu, this is no longer the case. Today, instantaneous broadcast satellite technology and the Internet can put the battlefield into your living room or onto your computer screen as it unfolds. This paper's focus is on why and how the operational commander's assessment and planning for the military-media interaction can and will directly influence the level of success. This paper begins with an investigation of historical examples to learn how the military-media relationship evolved simultaneously with advances in information technology. The author then examines recent military operations highlighting military-media lessons learned or not learned. Finally, the author recommends several improvements to improve military-media success in future operations.

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INTRODUCTION

Quiet on the set....OK...ready....Lights, Camera.....ACTION! The familiar sounds of a director as they orchestrate actors in a scene for an upcoming movie. Perhaps--but, today, more often than not, these are the sounds of the news media heard and seen 'live' from the forward edge of a battle area. In many instances, the cry of "Lights, Camera, Action" is heard as the first wave of America's fighting forces descend upon their objective.

Most over the age of 30 have grown up accepting the premise that wars are waged by generals and later analyzed by historians. As the twentieth century bids us adieu, this is no longer the case. Today, instantaneous broadcast satellite technology and the Internet can put the battlefield into your living room or onto your computer screen as it unfolds.

Numerous studies and research on the military-media relationship have been conducted in the past dozen years. Experts have looked long and hard into this relationship and the pros and cons of utilizing the 'pool' concept of reporting versus open reporting. However, current guidelines (Appendix A) listed in the DOD Statement of Principles: News Coverage of Combat, calls for "open and independent reporting."[1] Therefore, this author felt compelled to investigate the military-media relationship through the eyes of the operational commander with reality being that the media will be in the area of operations - more than likely before forces arrive. This paper's focus is on why and how the operational commander's assessment and planning for the military-media interaction can and will directly influence the level of success achieved and how the results of that media interaction could have a profound impact on public opinion and future strategic decisions.

This study begins with an investigation of historical examples to learn how the military-media relationship evolved simultaneously with advances information technology. In an examination of recent military operations, the author highlights some military-media lessons learned or not learned. The author concludes that no DOD guidance, special Rules Of Engagement, or Memorandums of Understanding will even begin to solve the military-media dilemma until there is a basic attitudinal change on both sides. The author closes with several recommendations to improve military-media success in future operations.

UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF THE ARGUMENT

Before reflecting on the historical significance of this relationship, it's important that the reader recognize the basic argument. When the media and the military meet during a conflict, clashes are inevitable. The military wants to win the war and keep casualties at a minimum while the press wants to tell the story. The press wants freedom and the military wants control. These are fundamental differences that will never change.[2]

The first ten Amendments (Bill of Rights) to the Constitution, ratified December 15, 1791, gave to the people various rights. Perhaps the most scrutinized, most dissected amendment was the first amendment guaranteeing us our right of free speech.

The question being bantered back and forth in various military, media, and governmental arenas is could that freedom sometimes jeopardize or compromise our national security as it pertains to the media's coverage of the military on the battlefield? This is a question that haunts front-line commanders as they watch their soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines interviewed and televised "live" in combat and operations other than war.

The American public looms large in any study of military-media relationship. No longer a mere 'after-the-fact' spectator, the American public as become a decision maker, determining if, when and how the U.S. military will participate in world crisis situations.[3]

Images of U.S. soldiers and Marines under fire in Somalia, or captured United Nations peace keepers in Bosnia shape public opinion about our involvement in such missions. Today, no American President will expose our forces to danger without the public's consent.[4]

The Information technology tidal wave has changed every aspect of today's society to include the military. Operational planning requires the commander and staff to understand the affect the military-media relationship has on the operation. The commander and staff must also realize how the new emerging role of world-wide mass communication has brought closer the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

Images and stories emanating from the battlefield are received instantaneously not only by Americans but also by the world community audience, to include the operational commander's very adversary. Because of the media's access to front line fighting, the actions of a single unit, plane, or ship, today, are seen world wide and could have subsequent impact on future strategic decisions. War and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are now observed through a close-up lens and the net effect is a significantly decreased margin of error on the battlefield and peace keeping operations.[5]

Ironically, Clausewitz's triangle about the interrelationship between the military, the government, and the people (public opinion) now becomes even more important in today's age of instant global communications. The media has become the filter (shown below) between the military and the people and from the people to the government through which the message is amplified, colored, and dramatized.[6] The media plays a key role in shaping public opinion. In that regard, the military needs the media as they are the military's main pipeline to the public.

Therefore, a critical task for operational commanders and planners is to insure the public sees an accurate portrayal of the mission, through the media. The media filter (shown above) must be kept clean and translucent so as not to impede the message to the public. If the military-media relationship is not healthy or if the message is somehow blocked by the military, the results will be a discolored, distorted message received by the public. This blockage could lead to a distorted message, via public opinion, back to the government, as depicted in the following illustration.

Charles Ricks, in his report, "The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Ahead," states:

> *"The commander's operational task is to develop a*
> *well-resourced and responsive infrastructure to conduct*
> *news media relations. Failure to do so will not affect the*
> *scale of news media coverage; it will, however,*
> *limit the commander's ability to communicate effectively*
> *and risk distorting the public's perception of the military's*
> *effectiveness."*[7]

Therein lies the rube: access to the battle area to capture those images. The friction between the media and the military, nurtured over centuries and rekindled in the past ten years, boils down to who has the right to control access to those areas. The military is "not sure the media won't someday violate security and lose a war and lives, and the media is not sure the Army won't hide from the American public a battlefield decision gone wrong."[8]

HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS

This issue of media on the battlefield is not a new problem. It predates television, movie cameras and even still cameras. Author William Kennedy, in his book, "The Military and the Media," reports that generals and admirals have had the reporting and analysis of war pretty much to themselves until the London Times sent William Howard Russell to cover the Crimean War in 1854. He concludes: "Whatever the degree of journalistic competence there was before, things have not been the same since."[9]

In every war, the military has faced an increasing number of media so that an inherent tension between the aims of the journalist and the aims of the military in wartime has been a fact of life in every conflict this country has faced since the Civil War.[10] Additionally, information technology has fueled the military-media conflict, driven by the public's cry of "more, more!"

Miles and miles of telegraph lines and crisscrossing railroads emerging by the 1860's, at the outset of the Civil War, meant that newspapers were able to 'spread the word' to the far reaches of the country almost overnight. Daily publications increased (372) as well as the number of war correspondents (more than 500 for the North alone). The telegraphs and the railroads were the vehicles to carry news of the battles back to the anxious readers.[11]

Reporters in the North had more free access to the battlefields than Southern reporters but leaders on both sides mistrusted the loyalties of the press. President Lincoln imprisoned several reporters suspected of supporting the Confederate cause.[12] The government became active in censorship with the War Department's issuance of the 57th Article of War, warning journalists they could be court-martialed and jailed if they disclosed sensitive information. However, the government never followed through with any guidance and enforcing the order was mostly ignored.[13]

General William Tecumseh Sherman, notorious press hater, firmly believed there was a direct correlation between censorship and military victory. He believed the press deserved no rights at all during a conflict. "Sherman blamed the press for the North's defeat at the first battle of Bull Run (Little Manassas), because of reports printed in the Washington Star and The New York Times that listed the order of battle."[14]

Yet still, the informational technology advances marched on. Although Mathew Brady's pictures of Civil War battlefields revealed the bloody horror of war, they could not be reproduced in newspapers as the half-tone had not yet been invented. Instead, editors sent artists, whose sketches of the battlefield were turned into wood-block carvings which could then be printed in the newspapers.[15]

The World Wars saw additional advances in technology and the growth of mass media as the world got smaller and smaller. Reporters covering W.W.I faced limited access to battle areas at

first, since the United States was still declared a neutral. A reporter caught entering an unauthorized zone could have been tried a spy and executed.[16]

A media accreditation system was created during W.W.I so the government could select those correspondents they preferred to cover the action. Those correspondents chosen, swore to tell the truth, paid the Army $1,000 to cover equipment and supplies, while their sponsor posted a $10,000 bond to 'guarantee' their correspondent's adherence to military guidelines.[17]

World War II saw American's quench for current news increase as did the number of "live" reports. Edward R. Morrow's radio broadcasts from a London rooftop during aerial bombings are spellbinding to this day, despite the lack of visuals. The visuals (movies) still took weeks to hit the 'newsreel' screens in the local theaters and although, both W.W.I and W.W.II saw a steady increase in the use of photographs, they still had to be transported back to media outlets before being printed in newspapers and magazines.[18]

General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, knew that the military and the media were often pursuing conflicting purposes:

> *"The first essential in military operations is that no information*
> *of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in*
> *newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity.*
> *It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes*
> *diverse considerations."[19]*

W.W.II saw the military-media relationship reach its high-water mark. There was a 'one for all-all for one' battle cry as media correspondents wore uniforms and traveled with units while editors and publishers accepted battlefield and home-front censorship as the price to pay for victory and national security.[20]

Yet, in spite of the massive two-front, global effort which mobilized the entire nation, less than 1,000 correspondents covered W.W.II (approx. 600 in the Pacific Theater and approx. 400 for the European Theater). During the invasion of Normandy, the military formed its first media pool.

A group (less than 50) of Defense accredited reporters were allowed to travel with the units going into battle and then "pool" their stories and photographs so correspondents from other media organizations could also file stories.[21]

The Korean and Vietnam Wars were the starting point of the military-media relationship turning sour. Since the mid-'50's televisions began popping up in American homes and became the most immediate news medium. Americans could actually see and hear people talking on the battlefield and television coverage was definitely influencing public opinion. It was still far from being instantaneous as it generally took 5 days to deliver videotape to the broadcast stations back in the United States.[22]

Initially, during both conflicts, the military trusted the press, while the press supported the U.S. effort, and thus a 'no censorship' environment existed. As long as the press could get to an area of operations (since they were dependent on the military for transportation), they could report on it. Reporters had access to the troops, so they wrote about field conditions, soldier's attitudes, and gave first-hand accounts into the horrors of guerrilla war. These negative accounts had some affect on U.S. public support back home which in turn questioned U.S. policy in these protracted wars. This resulted in a stifling censorship by the military which drove a spike straight through the heart of the military-media relationship.[23]

The low point came when some members of the military blamed the press coverage for the loss of the Vietnam war. In a 1995 report on the relationship between the military and media, Frank Aukofer and William S. Lawerence state that although their interviews indicate this opinion is no longer held by top military and civilian leaders, it is still wide-spread among military officers. Of the officers surveyed for their poll, 64% said they strongly agreed or agreed somewhat with the statement that "news media coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort."[24]

TODAY: REALITY CHECK FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

In chronicling the technological explosion on battlefield reporting, we have evolved from: where it took several weeks for footage to end up in the newsreel screens in local theaters in W.W. II; to seeing a Vietnam fire fight on our television sets several days after it actually occurred; to today, where suitcase-size broadcast satellite technology allows reporters to send images live from the fray of combat.[25]

More than 1,500 U.S. media personnel covered the Persian Gulf War. Add to this number, thousands of print, radio, and TV media outlets operating throughout the free world able to send, via satellite transmission, stories and photographs worldwide in less than one minute. The whole world watched a live war unfold on the television screen. Now, the soldier from down the block USA, or from down the block-(pick a coalition partner's country) was in everyone's living room in "real time."[26]

Today, contingency locations for operation other than war are easier to enter, as far as the media is concerned, and harder to control, as far as the military is concerned. It is not unrealistic to imagine America's mothers and fathers at home literally watching their sons and daughters die in combat.[27]

General Eisenhower in W.W.II summed up media concerns for the operational commander when he said:

> *"Complete wartime coordination and cooperation can never be achieved between the press and military authorities. For the commander, secrecy is a defensive weapon; to the press it is an anathema. The task is to develop a procedure that takes into account an understanding of both viewpoints."[28]*

Operational commanders need to assess the military-media readiness of their commanders, task forces, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines long before H-hour approaches.

As a result of the last several military operations in Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, there have been pros and cons in the military-media relationship. It is not within the scope of this paper to critique each operation but, instead, to highlight some examples where the successful operational commanders and their staffs considered the military-media affect and those who didn't consider it, were not as successful.

During Desert Shield/Storm, the CINC, General Schwarzkopf, understood the impact of the media and used it effectively to enhance his operational planning but did not do so well in communicating his media intent to his subordinate commanders.

The media's extensive coverage of the initial Desert Shield buildup, making it seem larger than it actually was, delighted the CINC. World-wide media coverage, also seen by the enemy (Suddam Hussein), gave the impression the allied forces were much stronger and prepared than they actually were. This, in turn, gave General Schwarzkopf the time needed to amass the proper forces.[29]

General Schwarzkopf also witnessed the impact the media has on public opinion and its subsequent effect on strategic level decisions. The images of the Highway 6 bombings dubbed "the highway of death" by the media caused some concern from the public which reached the White House. This resulted in a phone call from General Powell to General Schwarzkopf in which General Powell asked: "We ought to be thinking about a cease-fire. The doves are complaining about all the damage you are doing."[30]

This is another example of how the power of the press on public opinion can drastically narrow and even merge the strategic and operational levels of war. General Schwartzkopf later summed up his feelings when he wrote: "I felt irritated -- Washington was ready to overreact, as

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usual, to the slightest ripple in public opinion. I thought, but didn't say, that the best thing the White House could do would be to turn off the damned TV in the situation room."[31]

In August of 1990, General Schwarzkopf sent the following message to his subordinate commanders in Desert Storm: "I expect you to accommodate the press's needs as best you can without affecting your ability to carry out your war fighting mission."[32] This commander's intent is too broad and tended to be interpreted differently by different commanders. This resulted in several problems reported by the media covering Desert Storm. Some problems noted were weak logistical support to reporters in transmitting news stories and arranging transportation to, from, and on the battlefield. This access was limited by ground rules, delays of security review of materials, and poor logistical support.[33] The commander's intent needs to be clear and understood at all levels of command.

There were several military-media lessons learned from the operation in Somalia. Having an effective public information program is one and is critical to the success of any operation, especially peacemaking or peacekeeping. Public affairs operations in Somalia were successful in dealing with hordes of media, as well as visiting congressional leaders and other public figures, some of whom were already 'in country' when forces arrived. Therefore, "a good rule of thumb is to have the public affairs team on the first plane in country."[34]

Another valuable lesson learned in Somalia--it is imperative that the operational commander have a keen understanding of situation awareness and that they communicate it to the chain of command. This ensures a prepared and 'mission aware' chain of command when interviewed by the media. The ability of the military to correctly assess the situation to the media will ensure the correct message is received through the media filter to the people.[35]

As Task Force Eagle arrived in Bosnia in 1995, forces were immediately descended upon by 1,600 accredited media, all expecting clear open access to units and service members. The

media's mission: record American's fighting forces performing their duties of enforcing zones of separation; freedom of movement and the rest of the peacekeeping compliance mandates; and instantaneously broadcast this to living rooms all over the world. In Bosnia, commanders were prepared. By planning and practicing their military-media relationship skills back in Germany prior to deployment, commanders had done their job preparing their units for dealing with the media once 'in the thick of it.' In Bosnia, the operational commanders ensured that their units were "media-on-the-battlefield" ready.[36]

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti additionally showed that both the military and the media could reach a common ground of understanding. During the initial planning stages, media teams were assigned to units spearheading the planned invasion. Following the peaceful deployment into Haiti, reporters still had unparalleled access to American servicemen and servicewomen. As one brigade commander stated: "letting reporters into my unit was the smartest thing I ever did."[37] This kind of attitude from the commander means it should also be well understood by every echelon below.

The time for dealing with potential military-media problems is not as a young Marine lance corporal is searching a vehicle for weapons. The time to deal with this dilemma is back at home station, months earlier, during the unit's initial planning and training stages.

PLAN FOR TOMORROW'S OPERATION TODAY

By understanding the roles and capabilities of the news media and their access to cover military operations, operational commanders can best prepare their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to 'meet the press.' By realizing the importance that information technology has on operations security and by planning for and training for the media relations mission, commanders

will insure a mutual understanding and accommodating relationship instead of one of evasion or angry confrontation.[38]

This author believes the true indicator must come in the form of the operational commander's guidance for media relations. What exactly is the commander's intent on media operations in the area of operations? This guidance should come early and often so subsequent commanders can plan and rehearse prior to deployment. It should start with the National Command Authority, Operational CINC, CJTF, and continue right down the line and it must be understood at all levels of command.

Joint Pub 5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II Annex F: Planning Guidance - Public Affairs is a good starting point for military-media planning. Joint Pub 7.0 Public Affairs (expected publication spring 1997) should be another good reference.

Another key aspect to the entire military-media process is feedback. Operational commanders must know what is being said about their units and receive feedback on how their media guidance is being received by the media. Daily 'dumps' or meetings held between the commander's public affairs officers and senior media representatives is one way to ensure a good media relationship. Meetings should be viewed as a 'give and take' time to exchange info and feedback on that day's coverage and discuss details for subsequent operations and logistical support. As always, the time to rehearse this concept is in the planning, exercising phases and not in the initial first few days of a conflict or MOOTW.

Aukofer and Lawrence's 1995 report offer some very worthy recommendations. A couple of the key ones are:

(1) establishing a military/media relations office in the Washington DC area that would be responsible for maintaining institutional memory regarding this relationship;

(2) adopting a "security at the source" policy which was employed in Haiti and Somalia and calls on the news media to adhere to mutually agreed-upon guidelines in exchange for broad access to the battlefield without general security review or censorship; and

(3) jointly developing an independent coverage "tier system"[39] in which the "pool system" could be bypassed in favor of open coverage through a tier concept.[40]

TRAIN AND EDUCATE FOR TOMORROW'S OPERATION TODAY

Training and educating, remain our biggest challenge. Training our junior and mid-level officers as well as our enlisted soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines now will prepare them for tomorrow when they will be the operational commanders and leaders of our fighting forces.

Does media-on-the-battlefield training fit into your training scheme? The Army's Chief of Public Affairs, Major General F.A. Gordon believes it does:

> *"It (media training) fits in the total context of our very training doctrine which tells us to train the way we fight. The first likely engagement in any contingency mission, especially one involving operations other than war, can be expected to be with the media."[41]*

As pointed out earlier, initial training and planning for media-on-the-battlefield is essential to a successful relationship upon execution of the mission. As commanders set up mock populated villages for role playing in their operations-other-than-war training scenarios, they should also set up the role playing for media on the battlefield. This is essential to realistic training as General Gordon points out: "the media today is ubiquitous - it's everywhere."[42]

In a military-media relationship survey conducted with the 1988 College of Naval Warfare Class,[43] 58% of those surveyed said they did not have sufficient training to conduct impromptu news conferences even though 60% had already personally conducted such conferences. Of

those who had conducted news conferences/briefings, more than half (51%) felt they did not have sufficient guidance from their superiors prior to the briefing.

In an updated survey conducted with this year's College of Naval Warfare[44] the results were not much better. When surveyed, 57% said they did not have sufficient training to conduct news conferences. More than half (52%) of those surveyed had already conducted some sort of media related conference or interview and of those, 45% felt they had received little or no guidance from superiors prior to the encounter. Written comments in the updated survey indicate a strong desire to see more training at all levels including joint, officer, and noncommissioned officer training. Comments also indicate a desire to see more doors open to media representatives participating in military education and military training.

The armed forces do have a well-defined system of formal Professional Military Education (PME) set at five levels available to its officers from pre-commissioning through senior level capstone programs. However, although media relations training is conducted to some degree, especially at the senior level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvilla wants to see more: "Public affairs training should start sooner than it does and be more extensive than it is."[45]

Education is the key to dispelling misconceptions about the media as well as increasing awareness of public affairs. In the Aukofer and Lawrence study, survey results indicate 65% of the military questioned felt the news media was more interested in personal power than in what is good for the country. Additionally, 91% of the military questioned felt the news media was more interested in increasing readership/viewership than in telling the public what it needs to know.

Both, the military and the media must make strives to improve their attitudes toward one another. Department of Defense public affairs officers interviewed for the Sharkey survey (a substantive investigative study done at The Center for Pubic Integrity)[46] stated that they were

overwhelmed by the number of journalists who showed up to cover Operation Desert Shield who knew nothing about the military. The military must make the effort to bring the media into the training and education system.

If it is not feasible to send individual reporters, print, or film crews to train with, or advise at, our major training centers, then a conscience effort must be made to send editors and middle managers instead. Utilize the philosophy that the military has been using for years - "Train the Trainer." Train the editors and the middle managers who, in turn, can go back and train or at least sensitize the news and film crews.

Let's say, for example, in next year's College of Naval Warfare class, there are several publishers, editors, program directors, or news anchors from leading media agencies in the class. Not only are we now training the trainer, but think of the wealth of knowledge the Naval War College now possesses and can 'capture' for an entire year in the form of guest lecturers / media panel discussion groups / leadership discussion forum topics / captured war game media scenario subject matter experts / assistant instructors for the NWC media relations elective course (FE590), etc.

If these mid-level media managers can't take ten months off from their respected media agencies (highly probable), offer them two years in which to complete the course. In this way, they can complete the requirements, in accordance with their schedules and, will probably stick with the program, especially knowing they can still earn a master's degree.

The media's messages, especially the instantaneous televised images, are so powerful that it is critical that reporters and photographers understand the military operational context and background in order to ensure success on today's battlefield or so that MOOTW can be properly understood by the public.[47]

CONCLUSION

So, while it appears the services have had some success in media education the senior level, it is clear that more emphasis should be placed on media knowledge and awareness at the lower levels.

The one constant that will never change is that the primary link between the American people and the military is the media. The media is responsible for maintaining the connection between the citizens of this country and the military sworn to defend it.[48] Peter Braestrup, a Korean War veteran and former Washington Post bureau chief in Saigon during Vietnam, wrote that when the media produce objective reporting from the battlefield, they act as "one of the checks and balances that sustains the confidence of the American people in their political system and in their armed forces."[49]

However, there is still a lot of work to be done because there is still a mind set in the military that it is us against them. At a recent panel discussion on the "Practical Aspects of Military-Civilian Interaction in MOOTW," held here in Spruence Auditorium, a young Marine major asked the following question on military-media impact on MOOTW: "We hated the media 20 years ago and didn't allow them access to the battlefield. Now 20 years later, we still hate them and allow them access to everything...." This is a dangerous mind set that we must change as we get ready to accept the responsibilities as leaders in the 21st century.

The biggest challenge for the near future is allaying those military-media relationship skeptics, working with commanders and integrating media personnel into training scenarios. Make both sides feel comfortable with the bottom line....telling the Armed Forces story to the American public audience and the world audience. If operational commanders are not comfortable with the

military-media relationship, it is going to be very difficult for their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to feel comfortable.[50]

Operational Commanders most likely to succeed are those who have assessed accurately the level of news media interest in their operation/area of responsibility, and have planned for, anticipated for, and provided for, the successful accomplishment of the military-media relations mission.[51]

For, no matter what the military planning process determines, it will be the American people (filtered through the media) who will ultimately dictate the end based on their confidence in the political as well as the military leadership, thus balancing the three variables in Clausewitz's remarkable trinity.[52]

APPENDIX A

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES: NEWS COVERAGE OF COMBAT

(1) Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

(2) Pools are not to serve as the standard of covering U.S. military operations. But pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity - within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

(3) Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

(4) Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspensions of the credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

(5) Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special Operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

(6) Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

(7) Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

(8) Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The Military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

(9) These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool System.

ENDNOTES

[1] Aukofer, Frank & William P. Lawrence, "America's Team: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military," The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, (September 1995), 197.

[2] Aukofer: 36.

[3] Mulligan, Ann, "Can We Deal with Media on the Battlefield," Public Affairs Update. Summer 1996, 20.

[4] Mulligan, 20.

[5] Squire, Lisa, "Mass Media: The Tenth Principle of War," Unpublished Research Paper, Newport, RI, 1995, 5.

[6] MacNeil, Robert, "The World Through a Lens: Television's Interaction with Policy Agendas," Harvard International Review (Spring, 1993), 64.

[7] Ricks, Charles W., "The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward." Strategic Studies Institute December 1993, 11.

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[9] Kennedy, William V., The Military and the Media, Praeger, Westport Connecticut. 1993, 16.

[10] van Duyne, Marty, "Pressing their Privilege," Public Affairs Update, Summer 1996, 24.

[11] van Duyne, 25.

[12] Sidle, Winant, "The Public's Right To Know," Proceedings, July 1985, 39.

[13] Aukofer, 37.

[14] Aukofer, vii.

[15] van Duyne, 26.

[16] Edington, David, "Media As A Force Enhancer," Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. 1994, 3.

[17] Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualty, (New York: Harcourt Brace Javonovich, 1975), 55-56.

[18] van Duyne, 26.

[19] Friedheim, Jerry W., "How the Public Can Win the Military-Media Battle," Editor and Publisher, April 1992, 6.

[20] Aukofer, 38.

[21] van Duyne, 25.

[22] van Duyne, 26.

[23] Edington, 4-5.

[24] Aukofer, 40.

[25] Mulligan, 20.

[26] van Duyne, 25-26.

[27] Mulligan, 20.

[28] Eisenhower, Dwight D., Crusade in Europe, (New York: DA Caps Press, 1948), 168.

[29] Shiller, 18.

[30] Schwarzkopf, Norman H., It Doesn't Take A Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 348.

[31] Schwartzkopf, 348.

[32] van Duyne, 27.

[33] van Duyne, 25.

[34] Allard, Kenneth, "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned," Institute for National Strategic Studies, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 85-86.

[35] Allard, 87.

[36] Gordon, F.A., "Smart Units fit Media Training into How They Fight Before Deploying from Home Station," Public Affairs Update. Summer 1996, 6.

[37] Shelton, H. Hugh et al. "Winning the Information War in Haiti," Military Review, November-December 1995, 3.

[38] Ricks, vii.

[39] An open coverage system set up jointly by the military and the media whereby the tier system would provide both military commanders and news executives with advance knowledge of the numbers of journalists who would be present and the names of news organizations that would be represented in a combat situation. The tiers would reflect the type of operation and the extent of mission secrecy required. Aukofer, 53.

[40] Kenitzer, Captain W. Allen, "The Odd Couple-A bird's eye view of military-media relationship: how it works and which way the wind is blowing," Public Affairs Update, Fall 1996: 29.

[41] Gordon, 7.

[42] Gordon, 6.

[43] Lemire, Joseph, "The Military and the Media," Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1988.

[44] Results of this survey are on file with the NWC Public Affairs Office, room 137.

[45] Aukofer, 82.

[46] Sharkey, Jacqueline, "Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf," (Washington, DC: The Center For Public Integrity, 1991), 19.

[47] Shelton, 3.

[48] Sharkey, 10.

[49] Sharkey, 10.

[50] Gordon, 7.

[51] Ricks, 2.

[52] Strednansky, Susan E., "Balancing the Trinity: The Fine Art of Conflict Termination," School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 1996, 45.

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